OVER 40,000 Pakistanis are estimated to have died at the hands of terrorists in the years since 9/11. However, this bloody saga has been over three decades in the making. During this period, in certain parts of the country, particularly in south Punjab, extremist elements have entrenched themselves in the warp and weft of the electoral landscape.

Political expediency is the bottom line in alliances or seat adjustments between mainstream parties and extremist/sectarian groups.

According to analyst Mohammed Amir Rana, “Although there are perhaps a maximum of 2,000 to 3,000 votes in each constituency where there is support for extremist groups, this is an important vote because, like the minority vote, it will be cast.” That means these groups, both Shia and Sunni, have the potential to influence the result in close contests.

In the coming elections for example, even the ‘secular’ PPP has made seat adjustments with the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) — formerly Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) — in Toba Tek Singh in central Punjab, although in the 2002 elections the latter’s candidate, Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi, had polled only 1,000 votes here compared to the PPP candidate’s 53,000 plus, the second highest.

In 2008 the PPP was again the runner-up here, this time to the PML-Q candidate, by less than 4,000 votes. That narrow margin may explain the PPP’s opportunistic understanding with the ASWJ in the impending polls. (Incidentally, back in the 1990s, when it ruled Punjab with a slim majority the PPP coalition government had actually inducted an SSP member into the provincial cabinet.)

The PML-N too is expected to make some seat adjustments with the ASWJ, especially in south Punjab, in the coming polls. Of late, the former has often been accused of being close to extremist groups — ironically so, as it was during its second tenure from 1997 to 1999 that the state for the first time took concerted action against sectarian groups in Punjab.

Abbas Nasir, former editor of Dawn, attributes this partly to its travails in recent years. “When Justice Dogar declared the Sharifs ineligible to contest elections or hold public office [in 2009], a deep-seated paranoia set in. If the PPP and PML-N coalition [formed in 2008] had stayed intact, and Shahbaz Sharif had not felt besieged by a hostile opposition in Punjab, the situation would have been better.”

Patronage and appeasement of extremist groups became part of state policy back in the ’80s under General Zia. This approach was taken firstly to counter the support and funding of Shia sectarian groups in Pakistan by the post-revolution Iranian regime, and then as a corollary of the state’s proxy wars in Afghanistan and later in Kashmir.

The US, determined to repulse the communist advance into Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, alarmed by the potential impact of the Iranian revolution in the region and on its own Shia population, poured money into the state’s coffers during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 till 1989 to fund a so-called holy war that was to have profound and long-lasting repercussions on Pakistan’s inter-nal politics. This “jihad” was handled by the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with manpower provided by right-wing parties and extremist groups as well as students at hardline madrassahs that proliferated across the country with the help of foreign funds.

General Zia’s policy of decimating mainstream political forces created a void that was filled by extremist groups. In 1985, when elections were held on a non-party basis during his tenure, many candidates made alliances with sectarian groups because they had the space to operate across Pakistan and recourse to mosques from where they could rally supporters.

Meanwhile, militants from the SSP and LJ had virtually free rein to terrorise minority sects and communities in Pakistan, and often got away with murder. According to a senior police official, “Our officers were very careful and diplomatic in their investigations, so no real threat was created for jihadi and sectarian organisations. If we took any action against SSP activists, they would start contacting different tiers in the government and drum up so much support that we would be compelled to retreat.”

Shia militants from groups such as the Sipah-i-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP) also committed violence, but without the advantage of state patronage, they were unable to sustain the momentum.

After 9/11, Musharraf could no longer ignore international pressure and, by early 2002, he had banned the SSP, the LJ, the Shia sectarian organisations Tehreek-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) and the SMP, along with Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi.

The banned groups soon re-emerged with new names. For instance SSP became Millat-i-Islamia Pakistan, and when that too was banned, it recast itself as the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat.

The banning of these organisations was counter-productive in some ways. Many of its activists went underground, thereby going off the radar completely, or joined political parties and injected their extremist philosophy into them. Journalist Zahid Hussain cites the example of a large number of SSP activists who joined the PML-N.

“That is why today several of its second-tier leaders are ideologically close to the SSP and that, more than anything else, is a very dangerous trend.”

Among the sectarian groups, the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) also made considerable headway into mainstream politics. Its president Azam Tariq, who had 65 cases registered against him, was elected three times to the National Assembly and once to the Punjab Assembly. In 2002, during Musharraf’s presidency, he contested elections as an independent candidate from prison but was released in order to cast the crucial vote that gave Zafarullah Khan Jamali, who was supported by a coalition including the PML-Q and the MQM, the one-vote majority Jamali needed to become prime minister. In return, Azam Tariq demanded, and got, the release of several SSP prisoners.

In 2008, when Shahbaz Sharif was a candidate for by-elections from Bhakkar, an area in south Punjab where extremist groups wield considerable influence, members of the PML-N (some say Sharif himself) paid a visit to Malik Ishaq, one of the LJ’s founders who was then in prison, accused of scores of sectarian killings. The SSP subsequently withdrew its candidate from the seat and Shahbaz Sharif was elected unopposed.Among the Shia organisations, the TJP also sought political legitimacy, which it achieved (under a new name because it had been banned by then) as part of a coalition of religious parties called Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal that was considerably successful in the 2002 elections.

The 2013 elections will see a new alliance called the Muttahida Deeni Mahaz, comprising five hardline Sunni religious parties including the ASWJ and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Samiul Haq). The alliance is fielding 70 candidates, and has said that it will seek seat adjustments with political parties.

The radicalisation of the political landscape that was set in motion so many years ago appears to be gathering pace, and that does not bode well. “When political parties court extremist groups for support, they help them acquire legitimacy as pressure groups, which then impose their regressive ideas upon policy-making bodies” says Amir Rana.

And however strange the bedfellows that politics may engender, this is not an alliance Pakistan can afford.